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Abstract 
This article discusses approaches to researching the risk-problems of industrial societies. It 
examines why the risk-constructivism neglects questions of the material production of risks in 
favor of questions of their communicative construction, while the risk-realism does it the other 
way round. Subsequently the possibilities of a synthesis of both approaches are being considered. 
The societal functions of risk-constructions are accordingly not limited to their efficacy in the 
sphere of social communication processes. They lie as well in the field of regulation of the 
metabolism of societies and their ecological environment. The validity of risk-constructions is 
consequently not only bound to their cultural weightiness, whether one believes in them or not, 
but to their capacity to manage realities, measured by their ability to bring expectations in 
accordance with events. Risk-constructions are not only transformed in the milieu of discourses, 
but also in the context of social practices which give the opportunity to acquire experiences and 
to perform learning processes in order to optimize risk-constructions as regulative instruments. 
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1. Prologue: Questioning Propositions and Approaches 
Are phenomena like the hole in the ozone layer or asbestos poisoning, global warming or electro-
magnetic radiation, real dangers? Or are they nothing else than phantom menaces? Do they exist 
as parts of the physical world? Or are they only questionable constructions of the media? Each 
attempt to give serious answers to these questions has to take into account the complex of 
epistemology, ontology and methodology that determines any elaboration of scientific truth [1]. 
For sure, this is valid also for the social sciences, that are working generally – and in particular on 
environmental and technological risks – in the area of methodological tensions between realism 
and constructivism [2,3,4,5,6]. The first approach analyses them in the context of the 
intensification and extensiveness of nature's manipulation and utilization. The second is focusing 
on cultural changes in the societal perception and processing of uncertainties. Do both 
approaches exclude each other? Or are there possibilities for a synthesis? Anyway, in order to 
settle recent struggles there is need to examine profile and function of these approaches. 
2. Introduction: Conflicts about the (Un-) Reality of Risks 
In so far as risks are associated with damages (being avoided) as well as with attempts to realize 
benefits they are necessarily related to particular interests that converge or diverge according to 
the stakes of the focal actors. As a discursive expression of this structure we can – together with 
Duclos (in his "Le Monde diplomatique"-article about "Effets nocifs des discours sur les dangers" 
[7]) – observe a characteristic pattern: "Certes, les discours se contredisent. Des puissances 
antagonistes minimisent le risque de leurs activités en majorant celui des autres: les partisans du 
nucléaire dénoncent les accidents de la route, mais insistent sur la vertu nucléaire face á l'effet de 
serre, ce que contestent les pétroliers".  
Against this background we can recognize that each (proposition that entails a) judgment about 
risks is a relative one, especially in its role as an element of the quarrel about the question which 
risks are more important than others as problems that need to be encountered by the society as a 
whole. None of them is true in an absolute sense and all of them are true in a relative sense, 
relative to other risks and relative to their evaluators. Some comparisons seem to be nonsense (or 
simply: manipulative) – the risk of nicotine abuse versus that of radioactivity from atomic power 
plants for example. But the quarrel about the priority of risks is principally useful, because its 
[accepted by Futures http://www.elsevier.com/locate/futures; will appear in Futures Vol. 41, No. 2, March 2009] 
 3 
purpose is to use our resources in such a way, that damages are as much as possible being 
prevented while gaining the greatest benefit.  
In this context obviously the question emerges: "What is, indeed, our benefit?" And how to 
assess those damages, by which some parties (individuals, groups, organizations) are more 
affected than others? And how to evaluate them when they interfere disparately either with our 
physical health or our economical welfare – either with our mental sensibility or our 
environmental quality?  
Interwoven into these questions is another issue which can be separated analytically, however. It 
is the question about the authenticity of risks. It expresses itself when we pose questions like: "Is 
asbestos in school buildings really dangerous?" or "Are electro-magnetic emissions indeed 
jeopardizing people using their mobile-phones?" or "Does there in fact exist some hole in the 
ozone layer?" or "Are we actually experiencing a world-wide greenhouse effect?".  
Moreover, doubt can be directed towards all known elements: whether a phenomenon is really 
able to cause considerable harm or damage or not; whether its occurrence is considerable 
probable or not; whether there are – or are not – possibilities to avoid or to compensate for it; etc.  
Starting from doubts about the genuineness of single threats each particular question can lead to 
the general question whether an "ecological crisis" truly exists, that is, whether the propositions 
of an "ecological crisis" of the society and the entire debate about this theme could be reasonably 
justified. At least a publication entitled "But is it true?" from Wildavsky [8] has to be understood 
exactly in this sense. Arguing expressively in this direction is, among others, Bailey [9] as editor 
of an anthology called "Global Warming and Other Eco Myths" and Lomborg [10] whose 
statistical monograph is published under the title "The Skeptical Environmentalist – Measuring 
the Real State of the World"1.  
Isn't it a fact, that the "end of the pipe"-policy has been quite successful? Didn't the air and the 
water become remarkably cleaner? Isn't it consequently time for the all clear signal? It seems 
easy to agree with authors like Maxeiner and Miersch [11] when they are pointing out, that 
                                                 
1
  With Fuller [97] we can get an impression of the public frontlines of the controversy ("Support and opposition for 
the 'Sceptical Environmentalist' are divided along predictable lines, with, say, 'The Economist' championing 
Lomborg and the 'Scientific American' condemning him") as well as of the inner-scientific contest about "the 
larger question of who is authorized to define the field of environmental science", or, more to the point, who has 
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"doomsday"-scenarios have increased the mobilization-rate and the protest-capacities of the 
environmentalist's movement enormously, and – on the other hand – that constructive, 
environmental policies are in need of a good portion of "Environmental Optimism" (so the 
English translation of their title). But tactical considerations and debates about collective attitudes 
cannot substitute environmental research and its analysis of the development of the actual 
environmental situation, even if they take into account the function of looped sequences like self-
destroying or -fulfilling prophecies that may release ameliorative effects.  
Obviously rather more research is necessary – in order to be able to clarify these or other public 
doubts, but above all because it is favorable to be well-informed about the width and depth of the 
problems we are faced with. That has of course its boundaries. For instance there, where in the 
face of the highly complex processes of "emerging systemic risks" [12] the limited prognostic 
capabilities of the sciences are being used in a politically motivated way, as if simple "if/then"-
statements were possible, or, to be more exact: could be scientifically justified in order to provide 
legitimation for political decisions.2  
Doubts, including those which emerge from other reasons or interests, cannot even be 
encountered by an elaborated (natural) science which is doing meanwhile precisely that, what 
critics have demanded for a long time, namely to "leave" the laboratories and start researching 
high complex "real-world problems" or developing not less complex innovation strategies, 
instead of doing their work of R&D under reduced, artificial, and experimental circumstances.3  
Anyway, we have to concede that climate-prognoses are in principle – like all other forecasts – 
uncertain! They cannot be as certain as the "Amen" in church. But it would be wrong to measure 
the "science of the complex" and its analytical power, that is developing i.e. in climate-research, 
by the standards of Newton – and his understanding of science conforming to the mechanistic 
world-view [13].  
                                                                                                                                                              
the right – or the epistemological supremacy – to interprete the statistical data of the broad cross-disciplinary 
field of GEC: only natural sciences and engineering or also economics and social sciences? 
2
  If it is true, that "the world in the past was less complex, less interconnected, and more forgiving of mistakes and 
miscalculations" because of the growing density of interactions between a multitude of differentiated systems 
then we should recognize that the proposition of Rejeski ([75], p. 48), that "many of the phenomena that 
policymakers face no longer change in simple, predictable ways" is today more relevant than ever. 
3
  This progressive practice does not need only interdisciplinary cooperation but also the permit to enter areas of 
increasing scientific uncertainty, regardless of simultaneously emerging problems (especially with regard to its 
evaluation or the chances for consensus) that are the price to pay for this kind of indispensable research [98,99]. 
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Answering questions about "What is true?" (or: "What is false?") is not just important in an 
academic sense. Acknowledging something as true or false has consequences beyond the domain 
of epistemology, namely in the social dimension. Seeking to convince all others in order to 
establish the dominating "reality" or "truth" (or better: "putative reality" or "propositional truth") 
of the society is therefore nothing less than usual business concerning the public agenda. Its cycle 
of common alertness, that attracts or distracts the (especially in 'information-rich' societies very) 
'scarce resource' attention [14] to or from the issues in question, correlates with electing 
preferential socio-political goals, elaborating priorities for socio-economic strategies and 
distinguishing paths of scientific-technological development [15,16].  
Especially "GEC", the issue of the world climate-related "Global Environmental Change", has 
turned into a controversial topic of this kind up from the mid 90ies. Bailey (1995 [17] – as well as 
2002 [9]) for example sees the "True State of the Planet" considerably less threatening, as the 
World Watch Institute (1996 [18]; as well as following publications out of this source), the 
German Advisory Council on Global Change (1996 [19]; as well as following publications) or 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (1996 [20] ; as well as following publications) 
are doing, with such an amount of success that Tonn [21] declares the thereby praised IPCC a 
"global scale transformative initiative" while others dispraise its policy of consensual, negotiated 
and goal-oriented statements as scientifically questionable.  
It becomes quite obvious that this kind of debate, about the "environmental question" of the late 
industrial society, is neither new nor uncommon, when looking at a simplifying historical parallel 
concerning the "social question" of the emergent industrial society [22]. There were arguments 
about its status:  
• Whether the "social question" is a fundamental, "objective" problem of modern society, that 
has become part of the socio-industrial reality right from the beginning, as one of the 
consequences of capitalism (of its unequal – and implicit: unjust – pattern of distribution of 
the produced wealth).  
• Or whether it is an "invention", fabricated by the labor movement, in order to receive a 
strategic pretext for whom or what to blame for, styling incoherent "naturally" caused (or 
"individually" provoked) phenomena like poverty, that no one (or no one besides the victims) 
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could be blamed for, into consequences of industrial capitalism (that finally could be blamed 
for all the evil).  
Together with Lau [23] we can recognize here, that already the definition of risks (followed by 
their management) has become a major subject in the arena of social conflicts. Risk-discourses 
are being performed which are a new type of social interest-conflict in so far, as they catalyze the 
distribution of risk-costs and -benefits. Beck's [24] thesis of a leveling of affectedness in front of 
the de-limited consequences of modern catastrophes should be corrected therefore. Even the 
example of global environmental changes presents another image. The insight, that humankind is 
affected as a whole, doesn't automatically establish a common (and uniform) horizon in the sense 
of one "World Risk Society" [25]. Yet conflicting interests about who has to react (e.g. to stop his 
excessive emission of greenhouse gases) or needs not to act (e.g. by the non-ratification of 
climate conventions) are gaining momentum, also in so far as divergent ways of doing so and 
distinctive amounts of expenditure are disputed in this situation [26]. On this background it is not 
astonishing – at least not for an observer trained in epistemology – that the theory-dependence 
and the therewith associated hypothetical character of stuff like GEC has obtained a prominent 
role in midst of the ongoing debate about the "risk landscape of late modernity" [27].  
With regard to this circle of issues some scientists have done some valiant and valuable 
explorations, but there remains – in terms of theory – some unsatisfactory state, because of 
missing sufficiently differentiated models that are able to cover all relevant aspects of the theme 
while integrating the necessary explanations. On one side or other of this debate …, there exists 
more than enough scientific power to develop arguments in order to criticize others, but less than 
enough power to back-up the own position while evaluating some phenomena as overblown and 
others as underestimated [28]. 
• Glassner [29], for instance, has elaborated (under the title "The Culture of Fear – Why 
Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things") a series of excellent analysis regarding 
phantom dangers (as e.g. "killer kids") and overblown risks (as e.g. "plane wracks"). But his 
thesis – that the selection of fears are standing in some particular relationship to the dominant 
cultural beliefs and biases (according to the theories of M. Douglas') – could be redirected, 
without any distortion, to himself and his selection of phenomena that should be counted as 
"real problems", respectively as solely "imagined ones", as for instance "poverty" and 
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"drugs" – that for sure mean a lot, respectively nothing unusual, to a liberal sociologist of this 
generation.  
• Another aspect of the same problem was analyzed by Easterbrook [30], who has – in his 
book about "The Progress Paradox – How Life Gets Better While People Feel Worse" – 
worked out the thesis that there exists a contradiction between the quality of life in terms of 
its objective indices and of its subjective perception that seems to be characteristic for our 
modern civilization. But his division of "the feelings of the people" on one side of the coin 
and "the ciphered facts of life" on the other side is too schematic and neglects the problem, 
that even the selection of some ciphers and facts, while neglecting other ciphers and facts, is 
contingent (may be arbitrary), and could itself not be done in an objective manner, because to 
select criteria is essentially a subjective value-judgment. From that results: there might be 
other ciphers and facts that are offering more than enough reason for the people to be 
frightened, although those ciphers and facts selected by Easterbrook seem to prove his 
suggestion that there is a hiatus between the inadequate and unreasonable feelings and 
perceptions of the population and the facts about life. 
3. The Ambivalence of Risk – A Paradox not Solvable? 
It doesn't matter if the sciences, the jurisdiction or the whole society is concerned, the fact is: "To 
err is human". Guilty parties are acquitted and innocent ones are condemned. Wrong hypotheses 
are taught and right ones are controverted. The society can agree upon ignoring real threats while 
attending to delusory dangers. Each decision could have (and regularly has) positive as well as 
negative consequences, and is therefore in itself a risk factor. Rapoport [31]– in his famous work 
about normative and descriptive approaches to "Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour" – 
speaks therefore about the emerging "ambiguity of risks"; confronted with this there is no other 
way than to decide under conditions of (more or less) uncertainty.  
Decision-making processes need to be sensitive to truth-claims. But there are at least – with 
reference to the distinction of explicit and implicit propositional types [32] – two ways to 
examine a statement. Frequently we hear: "I believe only that, what I can see!" or "I repeat only, 
what I have heard!". Both are points of view of daily life, referring, however, to something 
fundamental: Statements concerning environmental, technological or medical risks can be revised 
in different ways.  
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• One way is to assess their validity related to the complexity of the bio-physical world, related 
to our knowledge about technological, ecological or physiological interdependencies.  
• The other way is to judge them by setting them into the context of their socio-cultural 
complexity and to ask to whom they are of avail or of disadvantage ("cui bono?"), how 
trustworthy their originators are, and whether they are complying with generally recognized 
convictions or not.  
In order to illustrate both ways of reasoning, here some prototypical phrases: "It is true that 
asbestos is a hazardous substance, because experiments on animals have shown ..." or "That's not 
true! The critics of this useful substance (protecting people against excessive heat) just want to 
discredit the industry". "The holes in the ozone layer and the greenhouse effect are established 
facts, verified by the following measurements ..." or "They do not exist, they are merely a fiction 
created by environmental researchers and movements with mutual self-centered interests".  
The last mentioned statement, for example, can quickly lead us to the – rash – conclusion, that 
the global environmental and climatic changes are nothing but a construct of societal 
communication, blown up out of proportion by media events like Al Gores "Inconvenient Truth" 
[33], setting a good example of how society can construct a "problem" – or in the worst case a 
"State of Fear" (Crichton [34]) –, which perhaps in reality doesn't even exist or which dimensions 
are quite uncertain (cf., e.g., [35,36.37,38,39]).  
Now, how shall we – as social scientists – decide what is indeed the case? After all there are not 
only groups, which make us think that the perils posed by global environmental changes are 
exaggerated, but there are also those factions, which have a tendency to play them down.4 The 
ideology-critical discourse – concentrating on (differing and not seldom opposing) interests that 
may be related to (distinct) truth-claims of propositional knowledge – must remain of limited 
usefulness here, at least as long as the social sciences are not able to back up their findings 
independently with those of the natural sciences research [40], optionally including atmospheric 
physics, environmental chemistry or climatology. Otherwise nothing remains but – the 
methodically very questionable – statement that these arguments are nothing more than 
                                                 
4
  Here we just need to look at the example of the "industrialized countries", which are as a main originator of the 
climatic changes, as well the main beneficiary of a prosperity, which is being produced with 2/3 of the global 
consume of fossil fuels, while the "developing countries" are the most affected by the predicted shift of eco-
zones. 
[accepted by Futures http://www.elsevier.com/locate/futures; will appear in Futures Vol. 41, No. 2, March 2009] 
 9 
(contradictory) social constructions, in principle beyond any possibility of verification (or not 
less: falsification).  
4. About the Relationship of Problems and Problematization 
Veritable social conflicts about uncertainty-limits, evidences, and risk problems arise when the 
statements in question are settling issues of far reaching consequences like for example 
determining keys for the distribution of goods and obligations (imagine for instance the 
introduction of new limiting values for radiation during mobile-phoning or for the allowed dosis 
of organic compounds in drinking water).  
Conflicts of this type, however, can sharpen our understanding about issues like: "Is the world-
wide soil erosion more alarming than global climatic changes?". Whilst discussing issues in this 
way we can check, whether the public attention is adequately directed towards the most urgent 
problems. This is not at all an academic procedure. Since the public (and with them the scientific) 
discourses are directing the political distribution of means for risk-management; since they create 
models of intended technological progress and determine society's socio-economic strategies, 
they constitute a power which is influencing and reforming societal as well as environmental 
realities. 
False priority setting – or even worse: fear-driven attention to illusionary dangers – causes a 
waste of public resources without any, or, little ameliorative effects. Simultaneously these 
resources are taken away from trying to solve other, more serious, problems.  
The following question (representing the central theme of "Risk and Culture") posed by Douglas 
and Wildavsky ([41], p. 1) may serve us as a guideline for developing this field: "Are dangers 
really increasing, or are we more afraid?". In order to tackle the logical structure of this matter we 
can refer to a plain survey published by (the German popular magazine) Geo-Wissen [42], 
because it illustrates the quintessence of this issue. The question: "Is our life more risky today 
than 20-30 years ago?" was answered with a "Yes" by 57% of the interviewed persons. This 
could mean – simplified:  
• Life has actually become more risky, and the results of the survey are mirroring these 
changes.  
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• Life has objectively stayed as risky as 20-30 years ago, but the interviewed persons are 
assessing the present-day risks higher than those of former times because they have become 
more sensitive towards them. 
Correspondingly, in order to explain the development of a strong environmental movement, one 
could – focusing on the ideal type characteristics of the given arguments – say in a polarized 
manner that:  
• Either: The increasing environmental problems and augmenting risks of the technological 
progress have alarmed the public and have led to a mobilization of critical forces.  
• Or: The appearance of the environmental movement is the result of shifting values and 
cultural change and has nothing to do with increasing risks.  
When analyzing the different ways to verify these contrary propositions it becomes obvious that 
the decisive question whether the risks have been really increasing or we have become more 
sensitive about them, cannot be answered by surveys (investigating self-declared attitudes).  
The interpretation of survey results needs corresponding background assumptions (serving as 
context); either implicitly presumed or explicated ones. In the first case methodologically 
uncontrolled outcomes are to be expected. In the second case emerges the problem that explicated 
assumptions have to be accounted for. It can, of course, be mastered as far as this can be done by 
using knowledge generated by the social and economic sciences themselves – for instances about 
the development of the level of material wealth that is of crucial importance here. But another 
situation arises insofar as there is need to transcendent this knowledge-base because accounting 
for this assumptions is not possible, however, without recourse to those findings, which were 
elaborated outside of the focal surveying discipline "social sciences" (and its methodological 
prescriptions) i.e. in the form of an aggregation of environmental indicators or the documentation 
of reference-ciphers of health threatening perils [43]. Within the framework of sociological 
investigations this causes of course problems. It might be worthwhile though, to work upon this 
problematic issue, because it is a tricky matter to dissociate sociological research from other 
sciences and to base crucial keys of interpretation on mere opinion, the common sense of the 
mass media, or on the ideologies of institutional elites or social movements. It does not matter if 
one personally favors one position or the other; assumptions of this kind remain in any case – at 
least as far as science is concerned – unsatisfactory. 
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5. Considering the Constructivist Approach 
The constructivist approach comprehends "risks" as constructs of societal communication and 
explains "the increase of environmental and technological risks" through cultural processes of 
change. Douglas and Wildavsky [41] – two important representatives of constructivism within 
the field of risk research5, who are selected here in order to give an example for its specific 
pattern of argumentation and its implications – state, that the balance of power between the 
central cultural institutions (including the market and the hierarchy) and the sect as the socially 
peripheral subculture, has shifted so eminently, that the risk-aversions of social movements 
(which are said to perform "egalitarian" ways of life) have turned into a prevalent subject and 
thereby predominant "reality" for the developed industrial societies.6  
Environmental criticism is – according to these premises – (mis-) understood as (in any case) 
anti-industrial and anti-modernistic, originating from attitudes against the establishment, 
opposing capitalism etc., while the factual content of its argumentation – together with the 
possibility of truly existing causes for its concern, regarding environmental degradation or 
negative effects of technological progress – is neglected.7  
While focusing on established values and institutional stability as a guarantor of social order, they 
take up the prevalent point of reference of the American structural functionalism – however, no 
longer under the premises of the analysis of "equilibrium", but referring to the "resilience" of 
institutions. Here not the ecological problems appear as a threat to "society" (whereas society is 
thought as being something equal to the "established order" or the "ruling classes"), but instead 
(as a substitute) the environmental movement.  
                                                 
5
  Please note, that the "social construction of reality" argument could, of course, be discussed more appropriate by 
citing other authors (like Berger, Luckmann, Foucault etc.), who have been – and still are – more stimulating for 
the intellectual development of this really broad and multi-faced approach in general; cf., e.g., the overview given 
by Knorr-Cetina [100]. Nonetheless, with regard to the academic and public risk discourse, that is the particular 
focus of this paper, Douglas and Wildavsky have been – and still are – of upmost influence. 
6
  The decisive statement of Douglas and Wildavsky ([41], p. 10) reads: "Our argument is that a complex historical 
pattern of social changes has led to values, that we identify as sectarian, are more widely promoted. The sectarian 
outlook has three positive commitments: to human goodness, to equality, to purity of heart and mind. The 
dangers to the sectarian ideal are worldliness and conspiracy. Put into secular terms, worldliness appears in big 
organization, big money, and market values". 
7
  Douglas and Wildavsky themselves describe their own position as "centralistic": "Since we do not know what 
risks we incur, our responsibility is to create resilience in our institutions. But by choosing resilience, which 
depends on some degree of trust in institutions, we betray our bias toward the center” ([41], p. 198). 
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Since the risk-management of the industrial societies has been freed out of the grip of a purely 
technological-scientific (objectifying) as well as a purely cognitive-psychological (subjectifying) 
handling, this approach contributes valuably to the progress of risk-research in so far as the – up 
to then neglected – socio-cultural approach is strengthened [44,45]. It needs to be mentioned 
however, that their constructivism merely deals with the (ideational) processes of risk-
construction, but not with those of the (material) risk-production.  
Its (exclusive) explanation-claim closes indeed the gap, left by the risk-psychology. The risk-
psychology provides the understanding of individual differences in recognizing and accepting 
risks, but leaves the question open, why a variance of certain patterns of risk-preferences and 
-aversions can be observed within the population. The answer is thought to be the different socio-
cultural contexts, in which individuals live, the orientation of their thinking and acting towards 
certain institutions, leading to a whole typology of consciousness and behavior leading tendencies 
[46,47,48]. The different biophysical conditions of the individuals' environments and their 
alteration don't play any systematic role in this approach, not even as a constitutive element 
within a multi-factorial explanation-model of particular risk-cognitions. Why are nomads afraid 
to die of thirst? Since their culture requires it? Or: Because they live in the desert? The motives, 
which are supposed to lead to a change of cultural-institutionalized perception-, processing-, and 
action-preferences remain inexplicit [49]. Are they only culturally caused? Or are they related to 
the accumulation of events and experiences, occurring as an indication of aggravating ecological 
problems? Sociologically it is therefore by all means imperative, to examine as well the structures 
of the material production of risk in and by society.  
Instead culture is being presented as the only "explanans". Their (rhetorical) question "are 
dangers really increasing or are we more afraid?" (Douglas and Wildavsky [41], p. 1), is (th-) 
ought to be answered merely by: "We are more afraid!". The phenomenon of "growing 
environmental and technological risks", which requires further explication, is merely diagnosed 
as the result of growing sensibility towards these risks, caused by processes of cultural change. 
Douglas and Wildavsky represent thus a radical thesis: Cultural processes of change are putting 
the individual into a state of uncertainty. The individual is looking for an object to project its 
anguishes onto and finds it in the form of environmental and technological risks. This thesis 
implies that the anxieties manifesting in this way – in the same way as the whole discussion about 
an "ecological crisis" – are actually (or leastwise in their tendency) misleading and unfounded. 
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An objectifying grasp on the question, whether increasing technological and ecological risks 
really exist or not, is being methodologically prevented. Likewise from the very beginning the 
fact that actually an industrial risk-problem might have developed which would have to be 
understood as the cause of the effect, namely the grown sensibility towards these risks, is not 
being considered seriously.  
This approach is one-sided in so far, as processes of the industrial-technological reproduction and 
formation of society become non-investigable. They are – like the factors of the "natural" 
environment – understood as something extra-societal. According to the sociologist's dogma (of 
Durkheimian origin), which says "social matters can be explained only by social phenomena", 
they are no longer to be comprehended as subjects of social sciences research, because 
constructivism defines "social facts" to be equivalent to "social constructions" (thereby denying 
as well any kind of objectifying sociological investigation of e.g. poverty as some kind of 
substantial social problem besides its communicative and discursive existence as social 
construction and theme of debate). 
6. Considering the Realist Approach 
The realist approach comprehends "risks" as objective elements of interaction between nature and 
society. It explains the "increase of environmental and technological risks" through the 
intensification and extensiveness of nature's utilization. According to Dunlap [50] – one 
representative of this approach, who has been selected here in order to exemplify some crucial 
points while reporting and considering his theses – the environment has to fulfill three essential 
functions for society, namely a) to provide it with resources ("supply-depot"), b) to absorb its 
refuse ("waste-repository") and c) to serve as "living-space" and habitat of man.  
If now an environment is used by one function, the other two are impaired. Given this setting 
there emerges a twofold "Gestalt" of human societies' ecological problematic. As a social effect 
of this interaction utilization competition and usufructuary conflicts ensue. The ecological 
systems – on the other side of the coin – are affected by pressures, which in the extreme disrupt 
their capacity to regenerate.  
If during the progression of industrialization the ecosystem "Earth" is increasingly utilized, the 
following ensues: 
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1) The three utilization circles overlap more and more and an aggravation of negative 
interactions among them ensues.  
2) The simultaneous expansion of all three functions leads to a transgression of the global 
carrying capacity or the environment's "ability to withstand" the stress.  
In the sense of this double shaped ensemble of usufructuary competition and degradation of the 
"environmental space" Dunlap [50] purports: An original ecological problem of the society 
subsists, manifesting in increasing practical problems and growing risks concerning the guaranty 
of the three basic functions. This problem will remain incomprehensible, if it is understood 
reclusively in the framework of the "construction of social problems" as a genuine phenomenon 
of social cognition and communication. The growing social attention towards environmental and 
technological risks is therefore in essence a responsive reaction to their actual increase.  
A critical review, dealing with Dunlap's statements constructively, needs to point out two 
clusters:  
1) The model of the three social functions of nature are in a shortened form anthropocentric-
utilitarianistically established – same as the concept of "environmental space" [51] inherent 
to the studies of "Sustainable Netherlands" [52] and "Future-Oriented Germany" [53]. An 
elaborated eco-systemic structure or at least a link to the ecosystems research and modeling 
(es e.g. offered by Holling [54]) is missing. Since temporal and spatial dynamics stay 
inexplicit, a systematic distinction between short term limit-transgressions, which can occur 
without causing irreversible damages, and long term strains is not possible; nor a distinction 
between positive and negative synergism-effects, accumulation-effects and threshold value-
mechanisms. Systematically unexplained is also the distinction between ecologically 
harmless utilization-forms, "disturbances" that can be counterbalanced, repairable or 
renaturable interventions and irreversible damages.  
Also the possibility of positive interactions among the three functions is neglected, like for 
instance between an agricultural utilization and tourism. Another form of possible positive 
interactions, between one utilization function and some correspondent ecological condition 
parameters, like for instance between adapted agriculture and biodiversity, is equally 
neglected. Since an attempt to cover the dynamics of anthropogenic induced environmental 
changes and their repercussions upon society has not been made it becomes also impossible 
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to evaluate, how the shifts of problem-causes and effects are taking place. Because 
ecological after-effects of anthropogenic induced environmental changes frequently do not 
affect the party responsible, but affect – temporally and spatially shifted – entirely different 
actors, they do have far reaching consequences for the social appearance and performance of 
conflicts, molded by externalization-phenomena. Additionally it must be said, that a critical 
discussion of the employed carrying capacity-concept is not taking place. It could reveal the 
capacity-concept's population-ecological pattern in favor of the dependency of corresponding 
"limits" from socially shapeable technologies, procedures, and need patterns, of social 
practices and material life styles.  
2) Dunlap doesn't associate the model of the three societal environmental functions with a 
sociological-theoretical approach, that could take up the following questions: Which 
socioeconomic structural achievements produce certain material- and energy-flows 
[55,56,57] within society and which functional prerequisites in the form of supra-
technological infrastructure-systems, suitable institutions, and media are needed for their 
control? The point is that this question – in connection with a model of functional societal 
differentiation – determines also the attempt to answer the central question, why certain 
environmental problems are intensely heeded whereas others – sometimes "objectively" 
equally important ones – are neglected, respectively why certain problems seem for some 
sectors of society extremely important and for others not. An approach of this kind is 
necessary however, if one wants to explore, whether (and how) modern society can 
adequately perceive and process ecological problems and respond accordingly [58,59].  
A crude sketch of Dunlap's approach shows that its strength lies in its possibility to develop 
footholds for integrated ecological and sociological problem analyses and strategies to cope with 
occurring crises. Its weak point is the lacking concept to explore the question: In which ways are 
ecological hazards communicatively processed? And: Why are they either adequately, 
insufficiently or not dealt with at all? Here the perspective is implicitly designed to reconstruct 
the processes of social perception and constitution of environmental problems along the 
occurring disturbances of utilization (or rather utilization-expectations) by using the three 
functions. But then it would be inadequate to view utilization-"impairments" still one-
dimensionally as objective functional restrictions for arbitrary purposes. They rather ought to be 
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understood as corresponding to the different subjective or rather system-relative utilization-
intentions of different social actors. 
7. Considering a Synthesis 
Risk-constructivism and -realism are blocking each other. Their synthesis, however, lies at hand, 
since both offer important cognition opportunities to enlarge scientific understanding.8  
Krohn and Krücken ([60], p. 13ff) resolve the difference of both approaches "meta-
constructivistically". They understand the naturalizing risk-objectivism in itself as a culturally 
dominant, construed thought pattern. According to them, the risk-objectivism doesn't have more 
epistemological importance, than the culturalizing risk-constructivism, under which it is 
subsumed in reference to its cognition potential and its validity.  
My synthesis, however, resolves the difference of both approaches "meta-realistically" (exactly 
the other way around): The cultural priority of science is the result of the practical possibilities – 
of managing actions interfering with realities – opened up by science. The validness of risk-
constructs is not (entirely) reducible to their social genesis. Their cultural weight is (essentially) 
obtained by identifying their potential ability of coping with practical problems and real dangers. 
The following five theses examine the relationship of risk-constructivism and -realism and give 
an assessment of the points of the ("meta-realistic") synthesis: 
                                                 
8
  The three starting points of the following considerations may be also described by referring – on the one side – to 
an insight formulated by Kasperson ([101], p. 163) who emphasizes – in response to critics, stating that "the 
social amplification of risk suggests (…) a 'true' or 'objective' risk and a 'subjective' or 'distorted' risk" – that 
according to his view "risk is a composite of physically and socially induced effects" (emphasis added). 
Moreover he makes us remember the "oft-forgotten truism of risk analysis – that damage to people and what they 
value is the product of environmental or technological threat, human vulnerability to such threats, and values". 
The other reference is with Rosa [102], who said that "risk analysis's principal raison d'être is to inform policy 
and other public choices". Risk science therefore can not be done without building bridges "between theory (what 
is) and public philosophy (what ought to be)". The third starting point may be defined in more theoretical terms 
together with Jaeger et al. ([103], p. 18); they claim that any consideration of risk as a feature of modern society 
has to take into account some three simple observations: 1) "Individuals, collectivities, and institutions perceive 
some risks, but not others"; 2) "Some risks engender concern, or alarm, while others are unconsciously or 
willfully ignored"; 3) "Some attract professional attention, including management practices; some do not". 
Determining the very nature of risk, therefore, needs to include not only the moment of potential harm or 
damage, but also that one of choice driven by diverging values and evaluations of the human actor [104]. 
Embracing both moments, that of its contingency as well as that its perspectivity, risk can be defined – according 
to Jaeger et al. ([103], p. 17) – as a "situation or event in which something of human value (…) has been put at 
stake and where the outcome is uncertain". Consequently, concerning the "existence" of risk, there is to say that 
although "risk may be viewed as an ontological state of the world, humans neither ignore that world nor are they 
passive about it" ([103], p. 18). 
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1) Ecological and technological-"risks" are to be understood as products and constructs of 
social actions and social communication in their context of material and symbolical 
interaction between nature and society. 
2) Both the approaches of constructivism and realism offer necessary elements for the 
explanation of the phenomenon of growing ecological, technological, and health-risks. 
Independently, however, they are not sufficient to incorporate the risk-problems of industrial 
society. The examination of the social dynamics of actual dangers and risk-sensibility 
demands finally a combination of both approaches. 
3) Publicly debated is not just the evaluation of risks but also their ontological status. Risk-
constructivism and -realism are meta-positions within the processes of social debate and 
orientation, catalyzing the ongoing (materially and symbolically) changes of the relationship 
between nature and society. Within the debates about the reality and the assessment of risks 
their function is to stabilize those arguments that are – promoted by particular social actors – 
leading to some re-valuation or de-valuation of certain risk-definitions. 
4) Measures for the reduction of technological and ecological risks go along with steps to 
optimize the interactive relationship between nature and society. The risk-debate cannot be 
looked at separately. It needs to be seen in its context with the debates about ecological 
modernization and sustainable development. 
5) "More" reason (rationality) while dealing with the physical-ecological conditions of social 
actions is achieved by participative procedures, which are increasing the (inter-subjective) 
transparency of societal debates. The recognition and processing of risk-problems is 
accomplished by the participants of all sides more efficiently (differentiated according to 
subsystems, professions, cultures etc.) and by doing so the potential of societal self-
organization is augmented (in favor of the whole societies reproductive capacities).  
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The plea for a constructive realism9 as some pragmatic reflection of socio-ecological 
interdependencies does not mean to take sides within a technocratic narrowed risk-debate. It does 
not make any sense, however, to generalize the sciences in a relativistic manner, neglecting their 
competencies for practical problem solutions, which are necessarily bound to their specific 
potential of recognizing and analyzing realities [61,62]. The argument, that the (natural) sciences 
are producing just – as other social actors – constructs of social knowledge, which are unaware of 
their social genesis (that is thought to determine their validity) and thus produce merely a myth of 
objective knowledge, indeed hits upon a part of the difficulties, namely the competition among 
different forms of knowledge for the primacy of delivering orientational knowledge to society. 
But it misses another point. The argument ends at the latest there, where the corresponding 
operational knowledge10 of the sciences has become necessary to recognize and cope with 
dangers, which are generated exactly by the foregoing application of this knowledge in the 
scientific-technological practice of a modern industrial society.11  
A polycentric model of societal knowledge-production, -reproduction, and -utilization does not 
imperatively require a relativistic leveling down of all types of knowledge. Rather more 
important is the recognition of the specifics of heterogeneous knowledge-forms [63,64,65].  
Believing in science in the sense of a positivistic monopoly-claim on truth remains neither 
desirable nor viable. But acknowledging an informed, self-reflexive science (a science that 
understands its own operational performance using critical reflection) is by all means appropriate. 
It doesn't demand faith, nor does it need to impel its competence in an authoritarian and dogmatic 
                                                 
9
  This term ("constructive realism") is to express the programmatic sense, while the other ("meta-realistic 
synthesis") underlines the reflexive sense of the same idea. Please note, that my decision to use this term was 
made originally without any knowledge of the person and work of Fritz Wallner that I have become familiar with 
during my visiting professorship at the Institute for Philosophy of the University of Vienna during the winter 
term of 2007/08. As a direct consequence of this coincidence I am now in the position to foster my argument 
while citing him: "The differentiation between reality and environment does not aim at a relativism of 
knowledge. Nor does it aim at giving up the idea of knowledge at all. Its purpose is to avoid surrendering 
ourselves to the success of our constructs in the environment. The environment cannot be understood. We can 
only master environment with the help of our constructions of reality. If they serve us well for gaining control 
over the environment, we keep them. If they don't, we discard them. When it comes to knowledge, however, we 
can only refer to reality, i.e. to what we have constructed" ([105], p. 38f). 
10
 The distinction between "operational" and "orientational" knowledge is made on the background of Habermas' 
[106] classical work on "Knowledge and Human Interests", where he draws a difference between "instrumental", 
"practical" and "emancipatory" functions of knowledge. 
11
  Religious, esthetical, mythological or "post-modern" motives are surely very valuable, above all regarding the 
demands of such "societal relations to nature", which by some actors were qualified as "healthy", "pacific" or as 
"standing in accord or harmony with nature". They are not in the position however, to develop means and 
methods to resolve the industrial-society's environmental and risk-problems. 
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way. It has the chance to unfold its competence within a forum where questions of validity and 
value-judgment can be reasonably and openly discussed, so that a mutual enrichment can take 
place, by combining nonprofessional's logic with expert's logic, and everyday-knowledge with 
special-knowledge (cf. the procedure outlined by Shrader-Frechette [66], the more general 
arguments given by von Schomberg [67], and the comparison of strategies from Klinke and Renn 
[68]). The decisive resource for ensuring the effectiveness of intervention-strategies and risk 
management procedures rests according to Macgill and Siu "on the quality of the knowledge 
(scientific and social) on which they are based, and on the internal congruence of that 
knowledge" ([69], p. 1105). Each adequate paradigm therefore needs to be either reflexive as 
well as programmatic insofar as a balanced view of the whole risk issue has to combine two 
essential requirements that sometimes seem to be antagonistic: Without communicative 
understanding a solution of the ecology- and risk-problems of industrial society will be 
impossible; but without scientific research (and innovation) it will be impossible too!  
8. Modeling the Dynamics of Risk-Sensitivity and Real-Endangerment 
The following considerations about the relationship of risk-sensitivity and real endangerment are 
executed in form of a model, introducing the thesis of a validation of social risk constructions by 
processes of testing their applicability in reality. The model elaborates the consequences of 
different strategies to deal with risks, independent of the question what kinds of methods and 
procedures are appropriate in order to distinguish "genuine" risks from "ostensible" ones. The 
underlying assumption is, that not only processes of the dramatization and scandalization of risks 
are resulting in negative effects on society's welfare (Kasperson et al. [70]) but also the 
belittlement and trivialization of those risks.  
Assuming, that at the points A, D and G, lying on the symmetrical axis p, a reasonable ratio of 
risk-sensibility and real endangerment is prevailing, the following can be established: 
• to the right/below: their proportion is incommensurate, as the growing endangerment is not 
counterbalanced by more sensibility, necessary to encounter and check the dangers 
adequately; 
• to the left/above: their ratio is also incommensurate, as decreasing risks are not accompanied 
by a decrease in sensibility; 
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• to the right/below of p: increasing risks are not adequately checked by measures of risk-
minimization or compensation; 
• to the left/above of p: decreasing risks are not accompanied by cutting back the use of means 
(and by giving room for more opportunities).  
En détail the graphics gives information about several points indicating different relationships of 
real endangerment and risk-sensitivity related to the acceptance of perceived risks: 
A: Point A is a hypothetical location of stability. The sensitivity towards risks is constant. The 
real endangerment neither increases nor decreases. We assume, that at this point the risk-
situation is accepted in society and that the relationship of risk-sensitivity and real 
endangerment is adequately developed. 
B: The sensitivity towards risks remains constant, but the real endangerment has increased. 
Assuming, that at point A the perceived risk has been accepted, we have to conclude for B, 
that the risk-situation is no longer being accepted and that demands for risk-control or 
compensation occur. 
C: At point C the endangerment remains constant, but the sensitivity towards risks has 
increased. Under the premise, that at A the risks were accepted we have to conclude, that at 
C they are not accepted any longer, because the sensitivity towards them has increased. 
D: At point D the sensitivity towards risks has increased and also the real endangerment has 
increased (in equal ratio). At D there is no acceptance towards the perceived level of risks (to 
the right/above the axis q), but the relationship of sensitivity and endangerment is quite 
adequate (the increasing sensitivity has counterbalanced the increasing endangerment – point 
on the axis p). 
E: At E the risk-sensitivity has decreased, but the real endangerment remains constant. The risk 
is accepted (overflow of acceptance), because the point lies to the left/underneath of the axis 
q, and the relationship of risk-sensitivity and real endangerment is inadequate, because the 
point lies right/underneath of axis p. 
F: The risk-sensitivity has decreased at the point F. The real endangerment is going to increase. 
The risk is exactly accepted, because the point lies on the axis q. The relationship of 
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sensitivity and endangerment is quite inadequate, because the point lies far to the right/below 
of the axis p. 
G: As the risk-sensitivity is decreased, the real endangerment is going to decrease. The 
conclusion is: the risk-situation is accepted (because underneath q), and the relationship of 
perception and reality is adequate, since the point G is lying on the axis p. 
H: The risk-sensitivity remains constant, while the real endangerment has decreased. The 
conclusion is: the risk-situation is accepted (because to the left/underneath of the axis q), and 
the relationship of perception and endangerment is inadequate, because to the left/above the 
axis p (overflow of concern). 
I: The risk-endangerment has strongly decreased, but the risk-sensitivity is actually increasing. 
The conclusion is: as the point lies on the axis q (as also F), the risk-situation is exactly 
accepted, and as the point I lies to the left/above the axis p, the relationship is inadequate, 
because over-concern requires the engagement of to many resources causing a reduction of 
chances while the risks are actually decreasing. 
The points I, A, and F are situated on the axis q, indicating, that the risk-situation is exactly 
accepted. If we start from the axis q in the space to the left/below of it, the risk-acceptance 
decreases with increasing distance to this axis. If we move in the space to the right/above of axis 
q, the non-acceptance of the risk-situation increases with the growing distance to this axis. 
The parallels to p or q are lines of indifference. Therefore the perceived risk at the points 1 and 2 
is equally non-accepted (parallel to q), but at point 2 with an underestimation of the real 
endangerment and at point 1 with an overestimation. At the points 2 and 3, the relationship of 
risk-sensitivity and real endangerment is equally inadequate: the real endangerment is equally 
underestimated (parallel to p), but the perceived risk is not accepted at point 2, while accepted at 
point 1. 
Field I: A relative surplus of worry results in the real risks being overestimated; ⇒ a too high use 
of means to their decrease and compensation; the relative non-acceptance of the perceived risks 
results in a situation where inevitable damage-consequences are being tolerated in a too small 
measure and leads, instead of this, to the tendency of changing to alternate practices with a 
possibly more unfavorable ratio of chances and risks.  
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Field II: A relative surplus of worry results in the real risks being overestimated; ⇒ a too high 
use of means to their decrease and compensation; the relative acceptance of the perceived risks 
leads to the tendency to avoid the change to other practices with a possibly more favorable ratio 
of chances and risks; instead of this damage-consequences are tolerated in a measure which 
would be avoidable.  
Field III: A relative surplus of confidence leads to the underestimation of the real risks; ⇒ a too 
low use of means to their decrease and compensation; the relative acceptance of the perceived 
risks results in a situation where the change to other practices with a possibly better ratio of 
chances and risks remains undone in the tendency; instead of this damage- consequences are 
tolerated in a measure which would not be necessary. 
Field IV: A relative surplus of confidence leads to the underestimation of the real risks; ⇒ a too 
low use of means to their decrease and compensation; the relative non-acceptance of the 
perceived risk results in a situation where the change to other practices with a possibly worse 
ratio of chances and risks prevails in the tendency, while relatively unavoidable damage-
consequences are not being tolerated. 
The fields I to IV display the possible combinations of acceptance/non-acceptance12 and 
confidence/worry and refer thereby to a relationship of perceived and real risks to be understood 
relatively to that. The difference of risk sensitivity and real danger becomes in this way combined 
with the mental distinction of the societal over- or underestimation of the actually existing 
(environment- and technology-) risks. In this way the possible consequences of the chosen modus 
of dealing with risks could be differentiated and rated. The "ambiguity of risk" [34] can so be 
described unequivocally with regard to its consequences. The discussion of the consequences 
considers 1) the ends/means-relation (too little or too much means for reduction or compensation 
relative to the existing risk), and 2) the relation of risks and chances (change to other practices 
with a possibly better or worse ratio).  
                                                 
12
  This model does not allow the derivation of propositions on the issue of acceptability. The degree of the 
acceptance and/or non-acceptance of risks varies in this model (in contrast to its performance in society) 
independently of their perception. Whereas tendencies of the over- or underestimation of risks could be indeed 
regarded as a function of confidence/worry, this is not valid for the acceptance, because also great risks can be 
accepted, while small ones are not-accepted, independently of the socio-psychological tendency to overrate non-
accepted risk while playing down accepted ones. Here therefore further factors are coming into the play that are 
not part of the graphical representation. 
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Graph. 1: Risk-Sensitivity and Real Endangerment – An Evolutionary Model 
 
The model illustrates the thesis, that parallel running changes of real endangerment and risk-
sensibility are evolutionary supported. Meant is not progress, but simply a process, producing 
changes that have to "prove themselves worthwhile" (cf. Burns and Dietz [71] as well as Popper 
[72], who figured out an essential part of this argument). The testing-mechanism is to be 
understood under socio-cultural conditions as a double one. Social practices and their 
corresponding socio-cultural constructs are socially formed. They are subject to a selection by 
their socio-cultural environment, insofar as they have to be evaluated in processes of publicly and 
institutionally bounded communication. Thereby the principle of test and trial in the biophysical 
reality is indeed not discarded – but mediated. Certain social practices or technical innovations 
might be strongly preferred out of cultural reasons. If they fail or miss the conditions of 
biophysical reality insofar, as they cause high costs, require a high expenditure of work, function 
only poorly or are simply impracticable, the cultural preference for them will be devalued sooner 
or later. 
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9. The Society and the Functions of Socio-Cultural Risk-Constructions 
Our unique alternative is not that one of to choice between some naïve materialism, reflectionism 
or positivism and a not less naïve idealism, subjectivism or voluntarism. In contrast to this duality 
of viewpoints, I share the opinion of Horlick-Jones and Sime ([73], p. 447) that the really 
interesting questions arise "when one starts to consider the relationship between the ontological 
nature of an entity and the categories we use to describe it". Then we need to ask questions like 
"To what extend does that entity's 'innate nature' demand that its description takes a certain 
form?" (ibid) or "Conversely, to what extend do ideological and value 'spin' impose our 'way of 
seeing'?" (ibid). And, on this background, also their conclusion makes sense to me, insofar as 
they highlight that "The dynamic, therefore, is a tension between materiality and sociality" (ibid).  
This "tension" in mind I like to argue, that the function of risk-constructions is not to be 
understood as a single one. Risk-constructions have multiple social functions related to the 
functions of societies in general and to their differentiated social subsystems (like economy, 
science, politics etc.) especially. The decisive point is that the function of risk-constructions is not 
limited to the sphere of societal communication. The functional effectiveness of risk-
constructions is observable not only in the field of the structuring of discourses, but lies as well in 
the field of the regulation of the metabolism of societies and their ecological environment, 
maintaining the material basis of societies and their human populations. Recognizing both 
functions demands and allows for making use of an analytical approach that identifies the 
problems that emerge out of their dynamic interdependence. One of them is the life-cycle or 
performance of risks over various time-spans (cf. the typology of the German Advisory Council 
on Global Change [74] as well as that of Rejesky [75]) which is coupled to the in principle ever 
possible and in practice often observed non-synchronism of running discourses and gathering 
experiences, of attentive phases and the occurrence of events.  
The cultural studies oriented conceptual framework of risk-research is too narrow. Analyzing 
risks is allowed only related to social and cultural conditions and their effects on risk-
constructions. A conceptual framework that allows saying, that risk-constructions perform 
existential functions as well as communicative functions, is preferable, because societies cannot 
be reduced to mere systems of communication – they are also systems of action, which set 
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material goods into motion, transform energies and build up the material infrastructure of 
society's existence [76].  
The structural and functional affinity between futures studies and risk analysis – that provides a 
mutual invitation for harnessing its particular advantages – originates exactly at this point. Here 
they share the basic assumption that human actors "by their behavior constantly shape their 
natural and social environments and, in so doing, shape their own future, although not always in 
ways that they intend or understand" ([77], p. 33). And because of the fact that the process of 
shaping the future includes inevitably that one of shaping a path-dependent topology of risk and 
vulnerability [78,79] there is need to make use of this affinity – in theory by a mutual enrichment 
of research methodologies and techniques of forecasting [80] as well as in practice by an 
interchange of data, results and conclusions – in order to transform the uncertainty and openness 
of the future according to a common strategy that could best be expressed with Bell [85] as one 
of identifying the 'possible', forecast the 'probable' and choice the 'preferable'. Additionally there 
is to say, that the program of studying vulnerabilities and analyzing risks needs to be expanded in 
the direction of hypothetical questions and scenario-dependent tasks in order to become able to 
assist and accompany a twofold program that tries to provide for both: on the one hand for the 
critical deconstruction and review of common images of the future [81] and, on the other hand, 
for the mobilization of social fantasy and creative forces while opening up space for alternative 
views, discourses and challenges to the status quo [82]. A good possibility for accompanying this 
approach that focuses on social innovation and its pathways is to provide a program for "vision 
assessment" [83] that centres more on technology-driven scenarios.  
The above mentioned thesis which integrates the two societal functions of risk will be expounded 
in the following three points in the sense that a validation of risk-constructions takes place 
corresponding to social practices:  
1) Environmental, technological and health-risks are – like other risks too – symbolically 
formed within the space of communication. As social constructs these risks "exist" 
conceptually in a symbolical way. But symbols are not only phenomenal elements of worlds 
of social meaning, but refer to something lying outside of themselves: to real 
interdependencies between actors and artifacts which can be ecologically, technological or 
medically (de-) or (en-)coded [84]. If expectations which are linked to symbolical 
representations of risks are thwarted or frustrated, constructs are devalued; because a 
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constituent part of each risk-construction is a reflexive link (or reference) on the reality of 
itself (on a possible risk-reality related to the propositional truth-claim). Decisive for the 
truth of a risk-construct is not only its cultural weight, but also its capability to bring 
expectations in accordance with events.  
− The accident of the Chernobyl-reactor is a good example for this thesis, in so far it can 
illustrate the "phenomenon of reality breaking into a social or intellectual system" ([85], 
p. 267). It made it unmistakably clear to a wide public, that the faith in the safety of 
nuclear energy needs to be re-evaluated.  
− A less dramatic, but not less consequential example is the production and consumption 
of large quantities of CFCs, which was regarded by experts for a long time as harmless, 
as nearly ideal – chemically inert – propellant gas with manifold operational 
possibilities. Through the occurrence of the "hole in the ozone-layer" and the causal 
evidence of a nexus to the concentration of CFCs in the atmosphere one risk-construct 
(the harmlessness of CFCs) has became devaluated in favor of another one (that of their 
eco-toxicity.  
2) The capability of risk-constructs to bring expectations in accordance with events is 
equivalent to their capacity of regulation in dealing with realities. If events, which are 
actually a threat, like e.g. the occurrence of an epidemic, are not adequately represented by 
corresponding risk-constructs, the practical options of a successful management13 of these 
imperilments are likewise limited.  
− If for instance the possible occurrence of cholera is culturally encoded in such a way, 
that it can be only interpreted as the consequence of a normative deviant behavior, but 
cannot be related to hygienic reasons, then the threat of this illness for the cultural 
stability might be indeed fended off, by blaming a witch as the responsible party – 
however, the chances of overcoming this existential threat posed by the cholera 
epidemic would be much higher under the conditions of another cultural encoding of this 
health-risk.  
                                                 
13
  At this point I would like to underpin the value of the discussion between the viewpoints of positivism and 
constructivism written by Peschl [107] especially insofar as there is a comparative consideration of "to generate 
functionally fitting behaviour" as crucial point inside of both of the two alternative ways of describing the 
relationship between the world and its representation, in particular with reference to scientific knowledge and its 
underlying cognitive processes. 
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 We could say, that the social validity of a risk-construct depends on its cultural weight, on its 
capacity of stabilizing a certain order of social action (or – in times of revolution – of 
changing them in an intended way), whereas its factual validity depends on its practical 
potential while treating (or handling with) realities.14  
 Because of the cultures' inherent capacity to learn, their negative and positive experiences 
with the factual validity of constructs, as they occur in the context of social practice, are 
converted into a minus or plus of the social validity of these constructs. The social validity of 
constructs is thus anchored – mediated by these processes of their de/re-valuation – without 
further appeal in their factual validity. This connection is the feebler, the less effectual 
cultural judgments are.  
− If one follows for example the prescription of the Inca moon-calendar to dye wool only 
during full moon, this social practice probably has no further advantages or 
disadvantages, and can consequently be determined nearly complete culturally.  
− If the consequences are, however, on a much larger scale, the cultural valence of a social 
practice depends more on natural factors. An example is the "Potlatch" of North-
American Indians declaring fishing – among other issues – during the times of the fishes' 
reproductive phases taboo. This verdict has an ecologically regulative function with 
reference to the sustainable use of a central nutrient-resource, but fulfills also 
redistributive functions ([86], p. 132ff).  
3) Processes of experience-accumulation and learning are connected with expenditure just as in 
the case of experimental action. The society's costs of risk-constructs are composed of: 
a) the harm, arising when risks emerge,  
b) the costs of measures for prevention, minimization or compensation of risks,  
c) the opportunity costs, which arise, when the means bound by accepted risk-constructs 
are no longer available for the pursuit of other targets, and  
d) the transactional costs of measures for the exploration and evaluation of risks as well as 
the costs resulting from the change of practices, methods or technologies.  
 The under- or overrating of dangers has in any case cost-relevant consequences: When the 
relationship of risk-constructs and risk-realities leads to an under-estimation of a real danger 
                                                 
14
  The diagnosis of "Late Lessons from Early Warnings" [108] is a characteristic case of the discrepancy between 
the two just mentioned forms, but also for the learning process taking place over the time. 
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(independent of the base of this "false-construction" or whether it could be prevented or not) 
the ensuing result for society are damage-costs (a) on a much higher scale, then would be 
basically necessary. When their relationship leads to an over-assessment of the real danger, 
prevention- and compensation costs (b) as well as opportunity costs (c), are also much higher 
then would be necessary. Generally the same is true for the transactional costs (d). When 
practices, methods or technologies are replaced by different ones, the changeover 
expenditure plus the effort of information for the clarification of the advantages is only then 
justified, if overall the amount of the transactional costs is less, than the difference of 
damage-costs (a) and the sum of the risk-reduction-, compensation- (b), and opportunity-
costs (c).15  
10. Conclusion: How to Comply the Responsibilities of Social Sciences Risk Research? 
One might object now, that the society takes only the costs of those damages into account, which 
are verified by its valid (or better: accepted) constructs that are in practice equivalent with its 
ordinary measuring instruments. The gross-national-product (GDP), which doesn't register 
"socio-environmental damages" (as tentatively defined by the European Commission [87]) as 
costs, but credits them even positively, because income is obtained by managing their after-
effects, is a well-known but still valid example to illustrate, how also the quality and validity of 
measuring instrumentation become increasingly controversial when, as in this case, effects run 
contrary to their logic.16  
Independently of the fact, whether they are adequately perceived and economically taken into 
account, these damages have considerable consequences for social practice. They burden society 
and have to be mastered in some form. The more adequately these "external costs" are perceived 
                                                 
15
  Using this model could especially be helpful in order to compensate for a deficit of the "social amplification of 
risk approach" [67,79] identified by Rip ([109], p. 193) in so far its "focus as well as the concern is about 
intensification and the additional social costs accompanying 'exaggerated' responses" while neglecting "the social 
costs of attenuation of risk". The same is true with respect to Lomborg [110], because his plea to "keep cool" in 
front of the global climate change in order to avoid useless expenses remains one-sided. 
16
  One of the best illustrations of this mechanism might be a clear-headed analysis of modern Chinas forced 
industrialization politics. A recent synopsis, compiled by the U.S. Embassy Beijing Environment, Science, 
Technology & Health Section [111] concludes that considering "the differences in methodology, approach and 
coverage, estimates of the cost of pollution to the Chinese economy produced by Chinese and Western 
environmental scientists and economists are fairly tightly bunched between 3 and 8 percent". Therefore it is to be 
feared that: "The value of human and natural capital destroyed each year by pollution and ecosystem damage 
could be canceling out the increased output of material goods and services". With regard to the famous Chinese 
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and processed "constructively" the easier it is for the social practice to alleviate the burden and to 
reinvest the released means in a creative manner (at best in order to mobilize all innovation-
potentials directed to strategies like "ecological modernization" [88,89] or the "sustainable 
knowledge-based society" [90]). And exactly this is our task: to estimate risks as much as 
possible "realistically" in order to be able to handle them as much as possible reasonably. There 
is no patent remedy for this task. Moreover the social handling of risks and the corresponding 
hazards remain always a matter of negotiation and comparative examination of goods. Does that 
mean that everything has to run along the same scheme as hitherto?  
Two starting points, in order to redirect our efforts and make some progress, are:  
1) To favor those concepts of risk that are able to work preventively and to resolve problems in 
the context of strategies of sustainable development, instead of securing only isolated 
techniques or environmental problems (cf., e.g., the typology of "risk-syndromes" 
established by the German Advisory Council on Global Change 2000 [74] as well as the link 
between "Risk Science and Sustainability" set out by Beer and Ismail-Zadeh [91]).  
2) To tackle problems multi-perspectively, in order to – on side of the sciences – gain more 
understanding by using the changing perspectives of the particular disciplines. And in order 
to – on the side of the society – promote more reason through mutual insights of different 
horizons of experience and forms of knowledge in social practice (cf., among others, Jaeger 
[92] with regard to the relation between risk management and integrated assessment, 
Grunwald [93] and Newman [94] with concern to the nexus between uncertainty and 
sustainability, and Hjorth and Bagheri [95] for a systems dynamic approach covering this 
matters).  
Modern societies do have an experience–horizon that is open to an uncertain future. They are 
proceeding huge parts of their internal contradictions and external challenges in the mental form 
of risks in order to bring them into calculable forms that are situated at the limits of the basic 
approach of rational decision-making. Each of the possible pathways into the future provides a 
particular mixture of chances and risks that can not be fully known in the present. The arising 
conflicts about all that knowledge that is relevant for our choices which are shaping our future are 
therefore – even if they become permanent – not to understand as some kind of disturbance. They 
                                                                                                                                                              
story of success ("with annual growth in measured GDP of 7-8 percent") this means that finally – and despite all 
the efforts of hard working people – "the economy is producing little or no net new wealth". 
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are not a symptom of civilizational decay because they fulfil important functions in the face of all 
this, namely as movements of the search for orientation and providers of well-reflected 
information.  
The social sciences are embedded inside of these interdependencies and conflicts. As professional 
actors, the social scientists are carrying therefore a particular responsibility for the living 
conditions of future generations as well as for all the present processes that are shaping our 
future. They have to contribute to the generation, critical reflection and evaluation of all that 
knowledge that is needed here. Therefore – and in particular in order to master the tasks posed by 
the modern societies risk problematic – they do best to elaborate their disciplinary capacities 
while cooperating with others. Sociology is indeed a theoretical reflection-oriented science, but it 
is as well an empirical reality-oriented science [96]. It is therefore legitimate, to deconstruct 
social problems and to solve or handle them in a discursive manner in order to elucidate their 
genesis. The other – not less legitimate – approach comprehends social problems objectivistic 
and substantially, in order to work out practicable action models and political strategies to 
overcome them.  
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